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"Not Licensed for Radio Broadcast" 1 was the notice impressed on
phonograph records of musical renditions by Paul Whiteman's orchestra.
The records were made by RCA Mfg. Company and sold to the public
at large with Whiteman's consent. Bruno-New York, Inc., purchased
certain of the records from RCA under a contract that it would resell
"only for non-commercial use on phonographs in homes." With knowl-
edge of this contract and of the restrictive legend W.B.O. Broadcasting
Corporation purchased records from Bruno-New York and proceeded
to broadcast therefrom, duly announcing that the particular music was
transcribed. In RCA Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Whiteman,2 the U. S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit refused to enjoin the unlicensed broad-
casts and reversed the trial court3 which had granted relief under the
Waring4 case.
Concededly neither Whiteman nor RCA had any interests protected'
* Associate Professor of Law, Wake Forest College Law School.
'This notice appeared on five of the records in question which were sold be-
tween November 1932 and August 1937. After the latter date the notice was
changed to read, "Licensed by Mfr. Under U. S. Pats. (giving numbers) Only
For Non-Commercial Use On Phonographs In Homes. Mfr. & Original Pur-
chaser 'Have Agreed This Record Shall Not Be Resold Or Used For Any Other
Purpose. See Detailed 'Notice On Envelope." The envelope containing the
record gave further notice of the same limitations. Apparently four of the
earlier ,records bore no restrictive legends.
114 F. (2d) 86 (C. C. A. Zd, 1940) cert. denied 61 Sup. Ct. 393, 394 (1941).
The original suit had been instituted by Whiteman to restrain W.B.O. Broad-
casting Corporation and Elin, Inc., the sponsor of the program. By leave of
court RCA Mfg. Co., Inc., then filed a complaint ancillary to Whiteman's action
in which it asked the same relief against W.B.O. and Elin and further asked that
Whiteman who had made certain assignments to it be enjoined from representing
that he had the sole right to license broadcasts. Whiteman then discontinued his
action without prejudice. At the trial W.B.O. and Elin elected not to put in a
defense while Whiteman defended.
I RCA Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Whiteman, 28 F, Supp. 787 (S. D. N. Y. 1939),
Note (1940) 49 YALE L. J. 559.
"Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, Inc., 327 Pa. 433, 194 Att. 631
(1937), Notes (1938) 38 CoL. L. REv. 181, (1937) 51 HARv. L. REv. 171, (1937)
86 U. OF PA. L. Ray. 217, and other law reviews. The result of the decision now
being reviewed is to sanction a broadcast in New York which is certain to be
heard in Pennsylvania where it is forbidden. A Pennsylvania station, if a mem-
ber of a chain, may find itself guilty of a tort in permitting its facilities to be
used for a broadcast originating in New York. See in this connection Buck v.
Jewell-La Salle Realty Company, 283 U. S. 191, 51 Sup. Ct. 410, 7S L. ed. 971
(1931) followed in Performing Right Society, Ltd. v. Hammond's Bradford
Brewery Co., Ltd. [19341 1 Ch. Div. 121.
The Waring decision was followed in a North Carolina case involving the
same plaintiff: Waring v. Dunlea, 26 F. Supp. 338 (E. D. N. C. 1939).
UNLICENSED BROADCASTS
by the federal Copyright Act,5 which unlike the English statute,6 does
not include records in the classification of copyrightable subjects. Com-
mon Law theories which have been advanced in behalf of the orchestra
leader are: (1) An orchestra leader has a "common law property" in his
rendition; 7 (2) the records are burdened with an equitable servitude;8
(3) an unlicensed broadcast constitutes unfair competition 9 or an unfair
trade practice;1O (4) an unlicensed broadcast is an invasion of the
orchestra leader's right of privacy."'
THE COMMON LAW PROPERTY THEoRY
This presents a dual question. Is there a common law property in
the rendition of an orchestra, and if so, is it lost by reason of the 'public
sale of the records notwithstanding the restrictive legend? A new
musical arrangement of an old piece,1 2 a translation' s or dramatization' 4
of a novel, a reporter's stenographic notes of a-public speech,15 an
adaptation of a Shakespearian play with alterations in the text 1 6 have all
been held to embody such originality as to create a distinct property
right which is itself entitled to copyright protection. It would seem to
535 STAT. 1075 (1909), 17 U. S. C. §1 (1934). Section 5 contains a detailed
list of works which are copyrightable. From the original subjects of maps, charts
and books under the Act of May 31, 1790, the classification has gradually been
enlarged by amendments. Motion pictures and photoplays were added by the Act
of August 24, 1912, c. 356. No provision has as yet been made to cover phono-
graph records.
Copyright Act of 1911 (1 and 2 Geo. 5, c. 46) specifically provides in Sec.
19, subsection 1 that, "Copyright shall subsist in records . . . in like manner as if
such . . . were musical works . .. and the person who was the owner of such
original plate at the time when such plate was made shall be deemed to be the
author of the work... "' See CoPiNGER, LAw OF COPYRGHT (7th ed. 1936) 230.
' Such common law property was found by both courts in the two Waring
cases, supra note 4, and by the trial court in the Whiteman case, supra note 3. It
is apparently conceded by the court in the principal case, 114 F. (2d) 86 at 88.
'Waring v. WDAS, 327 Pa. 433, 194 At. 631 (1937); RCA Mfg. Co. v.
Whiteman, 28 F. Supp. 787 (S. D. N. Y. 1939).
9 Ibid.
" Waring v. Dunlea, 26 F. Supp. 338 (E. D. N. C. 1939). It is interesting to
note that the court did not find "unfair competition" but merely an "unfair trade
practice". Possibly the court was influenced by the then recent Wheeler-Lea
amendment to the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U. S. C. §45 (Supp. 1938)
which added to the existing power of the commission to prevent unfair competi-
tion in commerce the power to prevent "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in
commerce."
"' This view was urged by Justice Maxey in his concurring opinion in Waring
v. WDAS, 327 Pa. 433, - , 194 Atl. 631, 642 (1937).
'
2 Arnstein v. Marks Music Corporation, 11 F. Supp. 535 (S. D. N. Y. 1935),
aff'd. 82 F. (2d) 275 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936) ; Wood v. Boosey (1868) L. R. 2 Q. B.
340, aff'd. L. R. 3 Q. B. 223 (opera score arranged for a pianoforte) ; Edmonds
v. Stern, 248 Fed. 897 (C. C. A. 2d, 1918) (orchestration of song).
" Byrnq v. Statist Co., [1914] K. B. 622; Stevenson v. Fox, 226 Fed. 990
(S. D. N. Y. 1915).1 4Fleron v. Lackaye, 14 N. Y. Supp. 292_(Sup. Ct. N. Y. 1891).
1 Walter v. Lane, [1900] A. C. 539.18Hatton v. Kean, (1859] 7 C. B. 268. See also Aronson v. Baker, 43 N. J.
Eq. 365, 12 Atl. 177 (1888), and Aronson v. Fleckenstein, 28 Fed. 75 (C. C. N. D.
Ill. 1896).
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follow that there is a common law property in the rendition of an or-
chestra which is "interpreting" the work of another.17
The difficulty is not in finding the common law property in the
rendition but in determining when such property is lost by reason of a
publication. The performance of a play,18 or the broadcast of a radio
skit,19 is not a publication. So likewise the performance of an orches-
tra, even though it be broadcast, should not be deemed a publication. 20
But if the author of an uncopyrighted play or musical work sells copies
thereof to the public, there is a publication and anyone may copy and
perform the play or musical composition.2 1 Consequently where copies
of an orchestral rendition are sold by means of records anyone should
be free to use the record. In the one case the author has failed to avail
himself of statutory copyright protection; in the other no such protection
exists.
Can a restrictive legend on the record supply the deficiency in the
copyright statute? Such restrictive legends have been held ineffective
when applied to writings and musical compositions. So a notation on
the title page of the score of "Parsifal" that "This copy must not be
used for production on the stage" was held ineffective where the scores
containing such legends had been sold to the general public.2 2 Likewise
restrictions on the use of credit reports have been held of no effect where
the reports were available to the public.2 3 It has been said that "Where
"7 "The law has never considered it necessary for the establishment of property
rights in intellectual or artistic productions that the entire ultimate product should
be the work of a single creator ... It must be clear that such actors . . .as
... Booth ... Sarah Bernhardt, and Sir Henry Irving, or such vocal and instru-
mental artists as Jenny Lind, Melba, Caruso, Paderewski, Kreisler and Toscanini,
by their interpretations definitely added something to the work of authors and
composers... " Justice Stern in Waring v. WDAS, 327 Pa. 433, -, 194
Atl. 631, 635 (1937).
" Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U. S. 424, 32 Sup. Ct. 263, 56 L. ed. 492 (1911);
Tompkins v. Halleck, 133 Mass. 32 (1882).
XUproar Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 8 F. Supp. 358 (D. C. Mass.
1934), modified 81 F. (2d) 373 (C. C. A. 1st, 1936).
' See the -principal case, 114 F. (2d) 86 at 88 where the court after assuming
for the purpose of its decision that a. conductor has a common law property right
in his orchestra's rendition said, "It would follow from this that, if a conductor
played over the radio, and if his performance was not an abandonment of his
rights, it would be unlawful without his consent to record it as it was received
... and to use the record."
" Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U. S. 82, 19 Sup. Ct. 606, 43 L. ed. 904 (1899);
Wagner v. Conried, 125 Fed. 798 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1903).2 Wagner v. Conried. ibid.
2S Jewelers' Mercantile Agency v. Jewelers Publishing Co., 155 N. Y. 241,
49 N. E. 872, 41 L. P. A. 846 (1898). "The fact that the publisher of the book
undertook to place restrictions on the use which individual purchasers could
make of it, the effect of which might increase, rather than diminish, the public
demand for the book, does not constitute such a limitation as takes away from
the act of the plaintiff its real charicter, which is that of publication," Parker,
C. J., 49 N. E. 872, 875. The Jewelers case was followed in Larrowe-Loisette v.
O'Loughlin, 88 Fed. 896 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1898) (restrictions on the use of
printed lectures sold to the public) ; ef. F. W. Dodge Corporation v. Comstock, 251
[Vol. 19
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the publication in fact is a general one, even express words of restriction
upon use are inoperative.12 4  Therefore, it would seem that the public
sale of records, notwithstanding a broadcast prohibition appearing
thereon, is a publication which results in the destruction of the orchestra
leader's common law property.
THE EQUITABLE SERVITUDE THEORY
But if the restrictive legends do not negative a publication, do they
clog the records with an equitable servitude? The court in the principal
case made short shrift of the matter, concluding that restrictions on the
use of chattels are "prima facie invalid" 25 and that the records were not
subject to an equitable servitude. The law of equitable servitudes on
chattels is anything but clear.26 In England such servitudes have been
upheld in charter party cases. Thus an interlocutory injunction was
issued to restrain a mortgagee who had taken a mortgage on a vessel
with knowledge of an outstanding charter party contract.2 7  English
N. Y. Supp. 172 (Sup. Ct. 1931) (where the court found the so-called confi-
dential reports had not been "put within the reach of the general public").
2 Dissent of Mr. Justice Brandeis in International News Service v. Associated
Press, 248 U. S. 215, 256, 39 Sup. Ct. 68, 75, 63 L. ed. 211, 224, 2 A. L. R. 293
(1918) : "But it is also well settled that where the publication in fact is a general
one, even express words of restriction upon use are inoperative. In other words,
a general publication is effective to dedicate literary property to the public, re-
gardless of the actual intent of the owner."
25 114 F. (2d) 86, 89 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1940).
"See generally on the situation in England, Wade, Restrictions on User (1928)
44 L. Q. Rxv. 51. See also Chafee, Equitable Servitudes on Chattels (1928) 41
HARv. L. REv. 944.
-" De Mattos v. Gibson, 4 De G. & J. 276, 45 Eng. Rep. 108 (1858). Lord
Justice Knight Bruce said (4 De G. & J. p. 282, reprint p. 110), "Reason and
justice seems to prescribe that, at least as a general rule, where a man, by gift
or purchase, acquires property from another, with knowledge of a previous con-
tract, lawfully and for a valuable'consideration made by him with a third-person,
to use and employ the property for a particular purpose in a specified manner,
the acquirer shall" not, to the material damage of the third person, in opposition
to the contract and inconsistently with it, use and employ the property in a man-
ner not allowable to the giver or seller. This ride applicable alike in general as
I conceive to movable or immovable property, and recognized and adopted, as I
apprehend, by the English law, may like other general rules be liable to excep-
tion arising from special circumstances; but I see at present no room for any
exception in the instance before us." (Italics supplied.) Sixty years after this
pronouncement, Scrutton, L. J., in Barker v. Stickney, [1919] 1 K. B. 121, 132,
declared that while the doctrine of equitable servitudes was well established in
regard to real property it did not apply to chattels and the rule declared by Knight
Bruce, L. J., supra, had been found to be "quite impracticable", citing cases or.
price restrictions (infra note 28). However, seven years after Barker v. Stickney,
Lord Shaw followed the De Mattos case in Lord Strathcona SS. Co. v. Dominion
Coal Co., Ltd., [1926] A. C. 108. The purchaser of a ship had bought with knowl-
edge that the ship was under charter for a long period and was restrained from
using the vessel contrary. to the charter party. Lord Sh~iw said (p. 118), "In the
opinion of their Lordships the case of De Mattos v. Gibson still remains, not-
withstanding many observations and much criticism of it in subsequent cases of
outstanding authority."
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courts have, on the other hand, declared restrictions on the resale price
of chattels to be ineffective.28
On the other hand, two American cases have apparently approved
the fastening of such servitudes on chattels. In the one, a manufacturer
of presses had covenanted with the plaintiff purchaser that it would
not sell any press which could be used to print strip tickets in com-
petition with the plaintiff. Defendant, with knowledge of that contract,
purchased such a press and used it to print strip tickets. An injunction
was granted, the court stating that since contracts may be entered into
restraining the carrying on of business in certain limits it saw no reason
why contracts could not restrict the use of personal property.29 In the
other, a vendor had sold to plaintiff one of several electrotype plates for
printing a prayer book. The vendor agreed not to sell any of the re-
maining plates without the plaintiff's consent and also agreed to a price
schedule which both parties were to maintain for their publications.
The defendant, with notice of that agreement, purchased the remaining
plates from the receiver of the vendor and then proceeded to publish
and sell under the agreed price. In granting the plaintiff's prayer for
an injunction, the court referred to the doctrine of equitable servitudes
as applied to land and added, "We can see no reason why the same rule
should not apply in the case of personal property. °80 Oddly enough,
both cases were decided in the same state in which the case now under
review arose but no reference was made to either by the court.81
Restrictions on user have often been attempted in the case of patented
chattels. Thus a manufacturer of a patented article who desired to
spread the benefit of his patent monopoly to non-patented articles which
he also manufactured would place a notice on the patented article that
it was only to be used in conjunction with unpatented articles made by
him. Originally these user restrictions were upheld by the United States
1 8Taddy & Co. v. Sterious & Co., [1904] 1 Ch. Div. 354, Note (1904) 17
HARv. L. RFy. 415; McGruther v. Pitcher, [1904] 2 Ch. Div. 306; Dunlop Pneu-
matic Tyre Co. v. Selfridge & Co., [1915] A. C. 847.1 New York Bank-Note Co. v. Hamilton Bank-Note Co., 83 Hun 593, 31
N. Y. Supp. 1060( (1895), 28 App. Div. 411, 50 N. Y. Supp. 1093 (Ist Dep't
1898), 180 N. Y. 280, 73 N. E. 48 (1905).
" Murphey v. Christian Press Ass'n. Publishing Co., 38 App. Div. 426, - 56
N. Y. Supp. 597, 598 (2nd Dep't. 1899), citing New York Bank Note case, ibid.
" The opinion in the principal case was rendered by Judge Learned Hand.
Nine years earlier Judge Augustus N. Hand, speaking for the same court in In
Re Waterson, Berlin & Snyder Co. 48 F. (2d) 704 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931) had ap-
proved the doctrine of equitable servitudes on chattels as announced by Knight
Bruce, L. J. and Lord Shaw, L. J. in the De Mattos and Lord Strathcona SS.
Co. cases, supra note 27. He also approved the New York Bank Note Co. and
Murphey cases, supra notes 29 and 30, and said (p. 708), "Courts in the United
States have enforced rights resembling an equitable servitude binding on a third
party who has acquired personal property from one who is under a contract to
use it for a particular purpose or in a particular way."
[Vol. 19
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Supreme Court,32 but that tribunal later reversed its position and it is
now well settled that they are invalid.33 Except as permittted by the
Miller-Tydings Act34 and the various state Fair Trade Acts,3 5 a man-
ufacturer cannot impose resale price restrictions on his articles be they
patented or unpatented. 36
A contract provision that a certain lot of stale cigarettes should not
be sold within the United States has been enforced against a purchaser
with notice of the restriction.3 7 On the other hand, it has been held
that an agreement between a manufacturer and buyer of skee-ball alleys
restricting their use to a specific locality is not binding on a subsequent
purchaser with notice.38
Obviously the law of equitable servitudes on chattels is still in a
state of flux. It has been suggested that complexities of modern busi-
ness may eventually make such servitudes desirable.3 9 Does the per-
fection of the radio and the "swing orchestra" present such a com-
plexity as to warrant the application of the equitable servitude doc-
trine to records? Having applied the rule to records, where should the
courts stop? The possibilities are endless. Relief for the orchestra
leader should be given by Congress. 40  By legislation the uncertainties
of the equitable servitude concept will be avoided.
UNFAIR COMPETITION
Courts enjoining the broadcasting company have invoked the elastic
law of unfair competition. That the broadcasting company is in com-
"
2 Henry v. Dick Co., 224 U. S. 1, 32 Sup. Ct. 364, 56 L. ed. 645, Ann. Cas.
1913D, 880 (1912), overruled by Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film
Manufacturing Co., 243 U. S. 502, 37 Sup. Ct 416, 61 L. ed. 871, L. R. A. 1917E,
1187, Ann. Cas. 1918A, 959 (1917). For a discussion of this change in policy of
the Supreme Court see TouLmnm, TnADE AGREEMENTS AND THE Awnr-TRusT
LAws (1937) 186, et seq.
" Motion Picture Patents Co. case, ibid., and Ethyl Gasoline Corporation v.
United States, 309 U. S. 436, 60 Sup. Ct. 618, 84 L. ed. *559 (1940). Cases are
collected on p. 456 of the official report. On the subject of Tying Contracts see
WATKINS, PuBuc REGULATION OF COMPErITIVE PRACTICES IN BUSINESS ENTER-
Parsz (1940) 220, et seq.
" 50 STAT. 693 (1937), 15 U. S. C. §1 (Supp. 1939). The Act is an amend-
ment to the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.
" For an excellent review on the effects of these acts see WATKINS, Pumic
REGULATIONS OF COMPETITIVE PRAcTICES IN BUSINESS ENTERPRISE (1940) 101,
et seq.
" Ethyl Gasoline Corporation v. United States, 309 U. S. 436, 60 Sup. Ct
618, 84 L. ed. 559 (1940). See collection of citations appearing on p. 457 of the
official report.
" P. Lorillard Co. v. Weingarden, 280 Fed. 238 (W. D. N. Y. 1922), Note(1922) 36 HAmv. L. REv. 107.
"' National Skee-Ball Co., Inc., v. Seyfried, 110 N. j. Eq. 18, 158 At. 736
(1932) ; cf. Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed Company, 157 U. S. 659, 15 Sup. Ct
738, 39 L. ed. 848 (1895).
" Chafee, Equitable Servitudes on Chattels (1928) 41 HARV. L. Rzv. 944, at
p. 1013.
o See infra notes 57 and 61.
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petition with the orchestra leader is readily apparent. 41 Both are en-
gaged in furnishing musical entertainment to the bublic for which they
are either directly or indirectly compensated. Just what does the
broadcaster do that is "unfair"? There is no 'deception, for the com-
pany announces it is about to play a transcription of a rendition by
Whiteman's orchestra. Yet it broadcasts knowing that the orchestra
leader is unwilling to have it do so and that it is in some measure taking
away from him a valuable source of revenue.42 Is it guilty of playing
"a dirty trick" 43 on the performing artist? Certainly it is getting a
"ride" on the artist's fame, even if not entirely "free". 44
The bulwark relied upon by courts granting relief on the theory of
unfair competition is International News Service v. Associated Press,45
in which the Supreme Court enjoined agents of the Hearst papers from
copying news bulletins of the Associated Press in New York and
telegraphing the items to the Pacific coast where they were published
as Hearst news. The majority declared Hearst guilty of unfair com-
petition. On the authority of that case a broadcasting station was
enjoined from sending out news bulletins which it had taken from the
early editions of the plaintiff's newspaper. 46 So also a broadcasting
company was enjoined from broadcasting the progress of a baseball game
from outside points of vantage when the proprietor of the game had
sold the "sole broadcasting rights" to another.47 The opinion now under
"Judge Meekins in Waring v. Dunlea, 26 F. Supp. 338 (E. D. N. C. 1939),
found the defendant guilty of an unfair trade practice and made no mention of
unfair competition although he said (p. 339), "Both complainant and respondent
are engaged in a business of selling musical entertainment to the public."
"2 A record may be bought for $.75. Waring was paid $13,500 for a radio
performance on the Ford Motor Hour. See Waring v. WDAS, 327 Pa. 433, -,
194 At. 631, 635 (1937).
"See review of Nims, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE MARK,
by Rogers, book review (1929) 39 YALE L. J. 301.
' A broadcasting company purchasing the records has of course paid some-
thing. If the record instead of costing $.75 should cost $75 or even $750, it is
readily apparent that the ride of the broadcaster would not be free albeit the
general public would purchase few records. The court in the principal case sug-
gests that perhaps Whiteman did not get enough for his recording. Conceivably
Whiteman may be forced to make a choice, to charge so little that the public
will buy in quantities and risk the loss due to broadcasting of his records, or to
charge so much that the general public will not buy but broadcasters and their
advertising sponsors would still find it more profitable to use his records than
to engage his personal services.
"'Supra note 24. See note on the International News case by Kocourek (1919)
13 ILL. L. REv. 708. Also Grismore, Are Unfair Methods of Competition Action-
able at the Suit of a Competitor (1935) 33 MICH. L. REv. 322.
"O Associated Press v. KVOS, Inc., 80 F. (2d) 575 (C. C. A. 9th, 1935) re-
versing Associated Press v. KVOS, Inc., 9 F. Supp. 279 (D. C. Wash. 1934).
The Circuit Court of Appeals was itself reversed, on the ground that the juris-
dictional amount of $3,000? had not been established, in 299 U. S. 269, 57 Sup. Ct.
197, 81 L. ed. 183 (1936). The Circuit Court of Appeals decision is noted in(1936) 34 MICH. L. REv. 738, and the District Court decision in (1935) 44 YALE
L. J. 877.
" Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. KQV Broadcasting Co., 24 F. Supp. 490 (V. D.
Pa. 1938), Notes (1939) 24 CoRN. L. Q. 288, (1938) 25 VA. L. REv. 243, and
other law reviews. Contra: National Exhibition Co. v. Teleflash, Inc., 24 F. Supp.
[Vol. 19
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review makes no mention of these extensions of the Internationd News
case, but rather relies upon the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice
Brandeis in that case and concludes that competition is not unfair merely
because the profits gained are unearned and at the expense of a rival.
The International News case, we are told, "In spite of some general
language must be confined to that situation (and) certainly ... cannot
be used as a cover to prevent competitors from ever appropriating the
results of the industry, skill and expense of others." 48  In the Inter-
national News case as well as the broadcasting cases in which injunc-
tions have been granted against the dispersing of news produced at the
expense of the plaintiff, the courts have not given the plaintiff an un-
limited monopoly but have restrained the defendants only during that
period of time when the news had a value as such. Applying this prin-
ciple to the instant case, shall the court say that the broadcasting of the
record is not permanently enjoined but only for such time as music of
that nature has a "value"? When and if the public taste no longer
desires the Whiteman type of music, then may the defendant broad-
cast? Such a rule would indeed present practical obstacles.
The difficulties inherent in a future application of the principles
announced in the International News case were foreshadowed by Mr.
Justice Brandeis, 4 9 who favored legislation as the remedy. Mr. Justice
Holmes felt that if recognition of the source of the news were given by
Hearst there would be no unfair competition.50 Here such recognition
was given by the announcer.
Notwithstanding the declared purpose of the majority in the Inter-
national News case to prevent a "competitor from reaping the fruits"
of another's efforts and expenditures, 51 a number of subsequent de-
cisions have refused to apply that policy. A Virginia court in 1921
denied an injunction against an auto parts jobber who by means of a
cheap photographic process had copied certain pages of his competitor's
uncopyrighted catalogue and incorporated them in his own which he
accordingly issued at an appreciably lower cost.5 2 In 1929 the Circuit
Court of Appeals which rendered the decision now being reviewed
refused to enjoin a competitor in the necktie silk industry from copying
488 (S. D. N. Y. 1936); Victoria Park Racing & Recreation Grounds Co. v.
Taylor, 37 S. R. 322 (New South Wales 1936), Note (1938) 51 HARv. L. REv.
755. See also Sports and General Press Agency, Ltd. v. "Our Dogs" Pub. Co.,
[1916] 2 K. B. 880, 85 L. J. K. B. N. S. 1573, 115 L. T. N. S. 378, 32 Times
L. R. 651.
'"114 F. (2d) 86, 90 (C. C. A.2d, 1940).
248 U. S. 215, 262, 39 Sup. Ct. 68, 75, 63 L. ed. 211, 224 (1918), cited supra
Note 24.
" Separate opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes in the International News case, id.
at 246, 39 Sup. Ct. at 75, 63 L. ed. at 223 (1937).
5 See opinion of Mr. Justice Pitney, 248 U. S. 215, 241, 39 Sup. Ct. 68, 73, 63
L. ed. 211, 221 (1937).
"Crump Co. v. Lindsay, 130 Va. 144 107 S. E. 679 (1921). See Note, The
Imitation of Advertising (1932) 45 HARV. L. REv. 542.
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unpatented designs which had been produced at great expense by Cheney
Brothers and which had "taken" with the public. Having spared himself
the expense of making his own designs, the competitor was able to under-
sell Cheney.53 The decision in the instant case is in line with these
authorities which despite apparent hardship on the plaintiff have wisely
rejected the broad language of the majority opinion in the International
News case and confined it to its specific facts.
Dishonest and fraudulent business practices frequently are and
should be curbed by the courts as unfair competition. Our problem,
however, is neither one of fraud nor dishonesty but rather a doubtful
question of ethics on which reasonable men may differ. 3' Enjoining as
"unfair competition" what to the court appears unethical will not only
create practical obstacles in the application of such a policy but is sure
to result in uncertainty due to a contrariety of decisions. A further
objection to the use of the injunction on the unfair competition theory
is that the court thereby creates a perpetual monopoly in favor of the
unpatented or uncopyrighted work in excess of any monopoly afforded
by the patent and copyright acts. If monopolistic protection is to be
given the performer in his rendition, Congress and not the courts should
declare and fix the limits of that monopoly.
THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY
The court in the principal case properly dismissed, as unworthy of
consideration, the theory that Whiteman's right of privacy had been
invaded. Such a basis for relief had been urged by Judge Maxey in
Waming v. WDAS.54  It is difficult to see how a conductor who has
caused hundreds of his orchestral recordings to be sold to the public
and whose daily occupation is to perform in public either by personal
appearance or via the radio can be said to have had his right of privacy,
his right to be let alone, invaded by the broadcast of his records. The
essence of his success is his ability to keep the attention and admiration
of the public. Only in comparatively recent years has an individual's
right of privacy been accorded recognition by the courts,5 and the lim-
its of the doctrine are still uncertain and necessarily difficult of defini-
tion.56 But to protect the business interests of an orchestra leader on
" Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F. (2d), 279 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929),Note (1929) 43 HARv. L. REv. 330. See also Gotham Music Service v. D. & H.Music Pub. Co., 259 N. Y. 86, 181 N. E. 57 (1932) (no relief given to plaintiff
where defendant copied a new name under which plaintiff had at much expense
popularized an old song). See generally Chafee, Unfair Competition (1940) 53
HARv. L. Rav. 1289.
'"The actions of the broadcasters have already received legislative sanctionin two states. See infra note 62. "' 327 Pa. 433, - , 194 Atl. 631, 642 (1937).
" Since the well-known article by Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy(1890) 4 H1av. L. Rav. 193, much has been written in the reviews on this subject.
See, for example, Brandis, The Right of Privacy (1929) 7 N. C. L. REV. 435,See also 1 CooLEY, ToRTs (4th ed., 1932) §135.
" See Flake v. News Co., 212 N. C. 780, 790, 195 S. E. 55, 62 (1938).
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the ground that his privacy has been invaded by the public broadcast ol
his records would be a gross misapplication of the principle.
LEGISLATION
Bills extending copyright protection to cover phonograph records
and the rendiitions of performing artists have been periodically intro-
duced in Congress since 1906. During 1940 Representative McGranery
sponsored such a measure. 57 It was referred to the House Committee
on Patents which has failed to act upon it. In all likelihood the bill
will die with the adjournment of the 76th Congress, in which event we
may expect the introduction of a similar measure at the next session.58
Since in every orchestra several individuals are giving their own
renditions each artist might claim copyright protection.5 9  The Mc-
Granery bill accordingly provides that the performer of a rendition is
to be regarded as the author but that in the event of joint renditions
the conductor or leader shall be deemed the author and be entitled to
the protection of the Act.60
Whether Congress will eventually act to safeguard the interests of
the performer is problematical. 61 Meanwhile certain states have enacted
statutes favoring the broadcaster. Both North and South Carolina in
1939 adopted legislation which provides that upon the sale of a phono-
graph record any asserted intangible rights shall be deemed to have
passed to the purchaser who may use the record free from any restric-
tions. 62
It is submitted that the interests of uniformity and certainty will
be better served if the ultimate policy is determined by Congress.
57 H. R. 9703, introduced May 8, 1940. This bill is al substitute for Repre-
sentative McGranery's earlier bill, H. R. 6160, introduced May 4, 1939. H. R.
9703 proposes among other things to amend Sec. 5 of the present Copyright Act
by adding, "(c) The rendition and/or performance of any work when recorded
in a fixed, permanent form on phonograph records, disks, sound tracks, tapes, or
on any and all other substances or by any other means whatsoever, from and by
the means of which it may be acoustically communicated, performed, delivered,
or reproduced" (p. 7, of,,bill). Sec. 6 of the Act would be amended by adding
after the word "translation" the words "and recorded renditions and perform-
ances" (p. 7 of bill).
8 In a letter to this reviewer the Secretary of the House Committee on Patents
under date of Dec. 5, 1940, said, "I have been informed Congressman McGranery
is making a study of proposed amendments to the Copyright law, and will intro-
duce a bill again in the next Congress."
" See Chafee, Unfair Competition (1940) 53 HARV. L. Rxv. 1289, 1319.
'0 H. R. 9703, Sec. 29, p. 24.
" For a discussion of earlier bills and hearings had thereon see Revision of
the Copyright Law (1938) 51 HARv. L. REv. 906; PFORZHEIMER, COPYRIGHT SYM-
Posium (1938) 28, et seq.; Note (1940) 49 YALE L. J. 559. In Pforzheimer there
will be found a summary of legislation in foreign countries which have afforded
relief to the performer.
' N. C. PuB. LAws 1939, c. 113, p. 129, ratified March 16, 1939, N. C. CODE
ANN. (Michie, 1939) §5126(s) ; South Carolina Acts of 1939, §28, p. 53, approved
Feb. 17, 1939. It will be noticed that both of these acts are after the decision in
Waring v. Dunlea, 26 F. Supp. 338 (E. D. N. C. 1939), which was rendered on
January 25, 1939.
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